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BID SHOPPING IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
1. 1 Introduction
The practice of bid shopping is as old as compet-
itively bid contracts. Though technically not illegal, bid
shopping is generally held as an unethical practice by the
construction industry.
This report examines the various definitions of bid
shopping and its impact on the construction industry. Each
"player" in the bid shopping arena is identified and their
roles to foster and/or minimize bid shopping are explored.
Broad coverage is focused on the most common practices
being used today to minimize bid shopping including bid
listing, bid depositories, and separate contracts. The
legal ramifications of each method are also reviewed.
Numerous states have adopted a variety of measures in
an attempt to rid the industry of bid shopping and their
efforts are highlighted in this report.
The reader quickly becomes aware that the bid shopping
issue is steeped in legal murkiness and that efforts to
minimize the problem can lead to violations of both Federal
and State anti-trust laws. Strong arguments exist for and
against each type of corrective action. The reader is left
to draw their own conclusions.

1. 2 What is bid shopping?
Legally, several definitions of bid shopping exist.
The United States Comptroller General described bid
shopping as "the efforts of a prime contractor to reduce
his subcontract prices by shopping his lowest bid from sub
to sub in an effort to gain a lower price from another
subcontractor, this activity occurring after the prime
contractor has been awarded the contract" (It 52). At least
one state court has referred to shopping subcontractor bids
after award as "bid chiseling". This court defined "bid
shopping" as the act of shopping bids prior to award
(1:52). For the purpose of this paper the term "bid
shopping" refers to the practice of the prime contractor
using another sub's bid to negotiate a lower price from
other competing sub's, either before or after award of the
contract to the prime contractor.
1.2.1 The Effects of Bid Shopping
There appear to be few, if any, attributes to bid
shopping. Though it has been described as "the purest form
of competition" it is a practice generally condemned by the
majority of the construction industry (It 52). At the other
end of the scale exists a long and sordid list of the
harmful effects of bid shopping.
Opponents of bid shopping offer substantial reasons
why the practice is harmful to the industry. On the
surface both contractors and suppliers claim that bid

shopping promotes short cuts in quality, animosity, and
cheap substitutions (2s 26). Prime contractors have been
accused of pocketing the additional profit gained through
successful bid shopping after award instead of passing the
savings on to the owner (3il). This results in lost
profits to the subcontractor that can upset industry
stability over time (4i729). If bid shopping is prevalent
in a particular area the profit margins of the effected
subcontractors dwindles to the point that many will go out
of business. Those subcontractors remaining are then able
to raise there prices at will due to a decrease in
competition (5s 103). During this process the weaker sub-
contractors will slash their prices in an attempt to stay
in business. These subcontractors, if awarded the
contract, are forced to cut corners and sacrifice quality
in an attempt not to lose money on the job (5s 103). Those
subcontractors unable to remain solvent in the course of
the contract simply go out of business causing additional
expenses and loss of time (5s 103).
Bid shopping has created a phenomenon well known to
prime contractors. This phenomena is the "just under the
wire" submission of subcontractor bids to a prime only
minutes prior to bid opening. This is practiced by
subcontractors to avoid being shopped by the prime prior to
award. While effective, the result is that the prime has
no chance to examine the bids for mistakes. These errors

can easily lead to disputes over scope, increased costs,
and a poor performance of work (6:15).
David 6. Miller, former president of the American
Subcontractors Association (ASA), points out another
negative aspect of bid shopping. He states, "On a major
job, you may spend 80, 100 man-hours estimating that job
and putting off others. If you give the numbers to one
person who's not honest, the competition has it in five
seconds and you have wasted all your time" (2t26). The
implication is that a dishonest subcontractor can use
another subcontractor's quote as a ceiling price and simply
submit a lower without going through the expense of
preparing his own bid. Some subcontractors, to save the
cost of preparing a bid, simply will not bid on a job if
they anticipate bid shopping. The result is a further
decrease in competition (4t729).
1.2.2 Who are the Plavers?
In the bid shopping arena four distinct parties are
identifiedi the subcontractor, the prime contractor, the
owner, and the courts. Each of these entities can provide
either a positive or negative effect on the bidding
process.
1.2.2.1 The Subcontractor
Of all parties, the subcontractor is the most
adversely effected by bid shopping, simply by his

position in the contracting chain and the fact it is
his bids that are being shopped. The subcontracting
community is there own worst enemy. The subcontractor
has the option to participate in bid shopping and
those desperate for work often do. Through their
participation they perpetuate the practice.
1.2.2.2 The Prime Contractor
On the surface it appears that the prime
contractor benefits most from bid shopping. If he
successfully bid shops prior to award he may receive
the contract. Successful bid shopping after award may
net the prime contractor an additional "windfall"
profit (7i48).
These advantages are only temporary, however. As
the prime contractor continues his bid shopping
practice, some potential subcontractors will refuse
to participate while those remaining subcontractors
that do will inflate their bids knowing that the prime
will eventually "shop them down". The end result is
that the prime has less subcontractors to chose from.
Those subcontractors that enter into a contract with
the prime after being bid shopped can often lead to
trouble because they can't deliver at the price they
quoted (7i48).
Of the four parties involved in bid shopping, the
prime contractor is the most culpable. If the prime

contractor did not initiate the bid shopping* there
would be none. While the other parties aay foster an
ataosphere conducive to bid shopping, only the priae
contractor can start the process.
1.2.2.3 The Owner
There is no doubt that soae owners endorse pre-
award bid shopping because it nets thea a lower cost
for the contract. For reasons discussed earlier the
owner though aay end up paying aore as the sub-
contractors struggle with the actual costs of the job.
Post award bid shopping rarely benefits the owner
and therefore they are likely not to encourage it.
Every public contracts office has there own set of
rules and regulations to be followed in the bidding
process. If these rules are void of any sort of
subcontractor protection in the bidding process, it is
a subtle invitation for the priae contractor to shop
his subcontractors. Lack of protective legislation
for subcontractors does not happen by accident.
Strong lobbying groups exist on both sides of the
issue. Often, it is the lobbyist with the aost
influence that gets the scales tipped in his favor.
The owner Bust also decide how auch control they
want over the project. While soae owners desire to
leave the issue of subcontracts totally in the lap of
the priae contractor, others like to have "soae"

control over the subcontractor. Of course, froa a
legal standpoint, the owner does not usually want to
Incur any additional liability upon hiaself. This sort
of partial control proapts such unique legislation as
bid listing laws (4t732).
1.2.2.4 The Courts
While the courts do not have as defined of a role
in the bid shopping arena as do the other parties,
they do have a powerful iapact. As aentioned
previously, bid shopping is not illegal. But soae
aethods to curb bid shopping can incur contractual
obligations which previously did not exist.
Additionally, soae courts view any aeans to restrict
free coapetitlon to be in violation of anti-trust
laws. This coupled with the variety of opinions
produced by the courts actually deter efforts to
establish bid shopping restrictions.
1.2.3 Whv does Bid Shopping Flourish?
The prevailing reason why bid shopping continues is
due to the priae contractor attempting to aaxiaize his
profits. He is able to do this because he holds the
superior bargaining position after being awarded the
contract. He is able to deaand favorable teras froa the
subcontractor desiring a contract with the priae
contractor. The only thing the subcontractor can offer is

a lower price (4x726).
This action is substantiated by a priae contractor in
the naae of "good competition" (It 53). The priae feels
that if this practice is conducted in an "auction" type
atmosphere between the competing subcontractors, then it is
ethical.
There are also several legal principles that encourage
the use of bid shopping. Current contractual law dictates
that no contract exists between the priae contractor and
the subcontractor just because the priae has used the sub's
bid to prepare the priae bid. Soae subcontractors
stipulate in their bid that use of it in the priae bid
constitutes a contract if the priae is awarded the
contract. However* this is rarely done because aost
contractors refuse to accept such a condition (6x15).
Those public agencies adhering to the doctrine of
proaissory estoppel also encourage bid shopping. The
doctrine of proaissory estoppel dictates that a
subcontractor aust stand by his bid quote if it is used by
the priae contractor. On the other hand the priae
contractor is under no obligation to enter into a contract
with the subcontractor even if his bid is used and the
priae is awarded the contract. This principle creates a
legal "one way street" to the detriment of the sub-
contractor (6x15).
This legal principle is clearly illustrated in the





330 N.W. 2d 693 (Minn. 1983). The Minnesota state
agency awarding the contract required that general
contractors submitting bids list their subcontractors.
The general contractor, Madsen, was awarded the contract.
Holaan was one of the subs listed but was not awarded the
subcontract. Holaan then sued Madsen for breaking the
"contract" (8i5.4 (CR.2)).
The plaintiff (Holaan) argued the following!
(1) The listing of his naie on the bid document
constituted acceptance.
(2) There was no reason offered why Holaan was not awarded
the subcontract.
(3) It is unfair to bind the subcontractor under
promissory estoppel without binding the general
contractor.
(4) The general contractor's bid was a aatter of public
record and therefore constituted acceptance of the
subcontractor's offer (8i 5.4(CR.2) )
.
In studying the case the court reviewed and suaaarized
the views of coaaentators advancing the theory that the
general contractor should be bound to the subcontractor.
These views are as follows
i
(1) Bargaining of price quotes should be Halted to the
pre-award stage so that priaes and subs are on equal
footing after award as to any further negotiations.
(2) Provide stability and certainty to the industry.
(3) Prevent bid shopping.
(4) To provide foraality and let the coaaercial context
provide the necessary fact basis.
(5) To allow for necessary negotiations on open teras
without any effect on the price or nature of the work.
Justice Yetka, on behalf of the Supreae Court of Minnesota

wrote the following opinions
The bidding process puts the subcontractor and the
general in very different positions as to the content
of the subcontract. The subcontractors have the
luxury of preparing their bids on their own tiaetable,
subject only to the deadline for submitting their bids
to the general contractors. The saie bid goes to all
the general contractors and covers the same work. The
generals, on the other hand, are dealing with all the
various construction aspects of the project and with
numerous potential subcontractors. They coapile their
bids, as the various subcontractor bids are received,
within a few hours of the deadline for submission of
the prime bid. Specifics are necessarily given less
than thorough consideration and are left for future
negotiations. Finally, the lowest dollar amount
bidder is not always the one chosen to do the work or
the one listed as the potential subcontractor.
Reliability, quality of work, and capability to handle
the job are all considerations weighed by the general
in choosing subcontractors. MBE regulations requiring
an effort to use a percentage of minority contractors
are another potential consideration.
Binding general contractors to subcontractors because
the particular bid was listed in the general bid or
was utilized in making the bid would remove a con-
siderable degree of needed flexibility (8s 5.4(CR. 2) )
.
The implication of this and other similar cases is
clear. The courts can virtually endorse the practice of
bid shopping.
Then there is the issue of the greedy owner. For
example, let us say a low bidder on a particular job has
left five percent of a $5,000,000 on the table due to
an error. The smart owner will probably allow the
unfortunate contractor to withdraw his bid without penalty.
The greedy owner may force the contractor to either accept
the contract at that price or suffer the penalty of the bid
bond. Some contractors may not want to be "let off the
hook" due to the bid bond penalty, pride, or cash flow
10

reasons. The contractor is then left to sake up the
difference by cutting corners, change orders and bid
shopping (9:18).
1.2.4 Views bv Various Trade and Professional
Organizations
Several organizations have developed written policies
that deplore the use of bid shopping. While all agree that
bid shopping is bad for business, there is little agreement
on how to solve the problem.
The American Subcontractors Association (ASA) is
certainly the most active organization concerning anti bid
shopping efforts. Founded in 1966, the ASA is a nonprofit
trade association representing over 7000 companies across
the nation. The purpose of the ASA is the improvement of
general business conditions of both union and nonunion
construction subcontractors (3ti).
Interestingly enough, the oldest written anti bid
shopping policy written by a trade organization was
developed by the Associated General Contractors of America
(AGC) in 1947. The major provisions of the AGC's policy on
ethical conduct with respect to subcontractors and those
who supply material are as follows (Ii53)s
(1) Proposals should not be invited from anyone who is
known to be unqualified to perform the proposed
work or to render the proper service.
(2) The figures of one competitor shall not be made
known to another before the award of the
subcontract, nor should they be used by the




(3) The contract should preferably be awarded to the
lowest bidder If he Is qualified to perform the
contract, but If the award Is aade to another
bidder* It should be at the amount of the latter 's
bid.
(4) In no case should the low bidder be led to believe
that a lower bid than his has been received
(1.53).
In a show of unity against bid shopping, the ASA, AGC,
and the Associated Specialty Contractors (ASC) have
developed a joint guideline opposing bid shopping. The
guideline Is written as follows (3t35)i
Bid shopping or bid peddling are abhorrent
business practices that threaten the Integrity of the
competitive bidding system that serves the
construction Industry and the economy so well.
The bid amount of one competitor should not be
divulged to another before the award of the
subcontract or order, nor should It be used by the
contractor to secure a lower proposal from another
bidder on that project (bid shopping). Neither should
the subcontractor or supplier request Information from
the contractor regarding any sub-bid In order to
submit a lower proposal on that project (bid
peddling)
.
The Associated General Contractors of America,
the America Subcontractors Association, and the
Associated Specialty Contractors oppose these
practices (3i53).
Of all the trade organizations, the American Society
of Professional Estimators (ASPS) have produced the most
ln-depth statement opposing bid shopping. Excerpts from
their statement on bid shopping follows ( 3t 37-39 )i
Bid Shopping
Bid shopping, defined In Canon 5 of the [ASPS] Code,
occurs "when, after the award of the contract, a
contractor contacts several subcontractors of the same
12

discipline in an effort to reduce the previously
quoted price.
"
In other words, if a prise bidder attempts to compel a
sub-bidder to lower a previously quoted bid price,
that is bid shopping. Bid shopping may occur either
on bid day or after bid day; either before or after
the award of the contract.
In addition to price information, the status of a sub-
bidder's competitive position or technical scope are
equally sensitive. Legitimate practice precludes use
of this information in haggling, trickery, or coercion
of any kind. During contract negotiation, sub-bidders
should not be advised, nor should they inquire, of
other sub-bidders price or scope, nor of any changes
that would be required to qualify them as the
successful sub-bidder. After a commitment is made,
sub-bidders should request and should be advised of
their competitive position, both in price and scope.
Owners Hay Participate
Bid shopping is not confined to prime bidders and sub-
bidders. Some owners also participate by encouraging
prime bidders to bid shop and by bid shopping
themselves. Ethical contractors will propose value
engineering to lower their bid. They will not engage
in bid shopping.
Why ASPE Prohibits These Activities
The contract (or subcontract, or purchase order)
should go to the qualified prime bidder or sub-bidder
determined on bid day at bid time, excluding prime
bidders or sub-bidders who shopped or peddled bids
prior to bid time. This does not preclude a prime
bidder form using a bid higher than the low legitimate
bid, but the prime contractor cannot ethically ask the
sub-bidder to lower a price as quoted on bid day.
Ethical Dimension
The ethical basis for this stand is free competition
and fair play. The competitive prime bidder assumes
the low sub-bidder has carefully quantified the scope
of work, has evaluated his risk and pricing options,
has included a fee which will justify the risk,
offering the best price in confidence. To shop such a
prime is neither free competition nor fair to the
legitimate sub-bidder.
Many construction firms fall prey to the practice of
bid shopping and bid peddling in the belief they will
13

procure contracts not otherwise available to them. In
the short run. this may indeed be true. But, in the
long run, shoppers and peddlers gain reputations, and
soon find it sore and aore difficult to obtain
legitimate bids. This lack of legitimate bids causes
the bidder to "discount" even aore, because only those
sub-bidders who put "shopping aoney" in their bids are
available. This added risk aay be disastrous for the
bidder, should he be unable to "sell" the work for
this discounted price. Skill and insight are replaced
by gaabling and often greed. Professionalisa is
replaced by rolling the dice, and bid shoppers are
gradually isolated and change or perish.
Bconoaic Oiaension
In addition to the ethical diaension of bid peddling
and bid shopping, there is an economic one. Siaply
stated it is thisi Bid shopping and bid peddling
reduce the total profit available to the construction
teaa. When a bidder cuts a bid below the lowest
legitiaate bid, the bidder is adaittedly taking the
contract for less than originally desired and bid.
The bidder is, in other words, reducing profit below
what is really desired, and is doing so in order to
obtain work.
Mo contractor enjoys the prospect of making less
profit than desired. Therefore, the shopper has
strong incentive to develop ways to recoup that lost
profit. One of these ways is to cheapen quality. The
shopper aay not use the specified material and/or
allow workmanship to suffer in order to gain back the
profit lost.
Another way is to search for opportunities to increase
the amount of one's contract through extras. The
bidder is constantly motivated to seek change orders,
often pricing them at substantial premiums above the
actual cost of the work done. In either of the
scenarios, conflict is sure to result, and legal
issues arise. The original fee is lost or reduced by
discounting, and the added burden of legal fees to
resolve the ensuing conflict is inevitable.
Elimination of bid shopping and bid peddling is
essential if the construction industry is to regain
its rightful fee structure, and it must begin to
eliminate these unethical practices now (3t 37-39).
The American Institute of Architects (AIA) has found
itself in the middle of the bid shopping issue. The issue
14

is not so much as a natter of endorsing an anti bid
shopping policy but as a matter of what protection they
should afford the subcontractor in their standard contract
documents A 101 and A201 (10s 508).
The AIA finds itself between the two extremes of
separate contracts for all subcontractors as opposed to the
prise contractor having direct control over all sub-
contracting efforts. Naturally, the AGC supports the
latter extreme while the ASA and the ASC push for
additional protection under the AIA documents (10t508).
Prior to 1976 the AIA required that the architect had
to approve all subcontractors. In an effort to minimize
the architects role in the subcontracting effort and to
avoid the likelihood of liability the AIA has softened
their stance. Currently the AIA, in their document A201
para. 5.2.1, requires that the prime contractor "as soon as
practical after the award" provided a list of all
subcontractors to the owner and architect (4«733). This
new wording now leaves the door wide open for those prime





2.1 How Bid Listing Works
Listing of the subcontractor bids by the prime in his
bid submission is a popular way to control bid shopping.
This kind of control has become statute in several states
including Arkansas, California, Delaware, New Mexico, and
South Carolina. Each state has adopted their own
parameters as to what type of subcontract must be listed,
usually a monetary threshold. The justification for such
law is quoted as being a way for the state to satisfy
themselves that only competent subcontractors will perform
on the project (4i732). The statutes are normally written
so that substitution of the listed subcontractor will only
be allowed under certain conditions (lis 57).
A secondary justification often cited by state
legislatures is to condemn both bid shopping and bid
peddling because they adversely effect public projects
through poor quality of workmanship and materials, deny the
total benefits of free competition, and lead to
insolvencies of subcontracting firms (4t733).
2.2 The Pros and Cons of Bid Listing
The two strongest arguments in defense of bid listing
is that it reduces the possibility of bid shopping and
16

provides the owner soie control over the selection of sub-
contractors to be used on the project (9:21).
Another quoted advantage of bid listing is to the
owner. With bid listing laws the owner is confident that
the actual ainiaua price offered in a bid is the real low
price. The prime contractor is unable to pocket any
additional profit by "shopping" for a lower bid after
award (3s 2). Another plus is that subcontractors knowing
that they are protected under a bid listing law are aore
likely to bid on a project. This increases competition and
attracts highly qualified and reputable specialty
subcontractors (3«2).
Up to this point bid listing seems like the solution
to the bid shopping problem. Unfortunately, for each
advantage of bid listing there is an equally strong
disadvantage. For openers the Associated General
Contractors (AGC) has denounced the policy (2s 28). This is
no doubt due to general contractors wanting to protect
their profit margin and control over the subcontracting
process (3s 3). General contractors also argue that they
have a difficult enough time as it is analyzing and
comparing subcontractor bids prior to bid opening. The
post award period grants them the extra time they require
to determine the best subcontractor for the job (3s 5). It
is also argued by general contractors that bid listing is
"injecting" the government "...into the private contractual
17

relationship between a prime contractor and a sub-
contractor" (3i6).
Bid listing is not a foolproof Method to prevent bid
shopping. Unethical prime contractors have found loopholes
in soae bid listing laws.
One method is for a prime contractor to list a sub-
contractor with the understanding that the sub has the
option to accept a lower price if the prime can find one or
to substituted by the subcontractor offering a lower price
(Ili57).
Another loophole that has been used by prime
contractors is to intentionally list subcontractors that
are not qualified to perform the work. After award the
prime contractor brings this "error" to the attention of
the contracting official and is then permitted a
substitution (12s 24).
Still another method used to beat the system is for
the prime to list two or more subcontractors for each
specialty trade. The prime contractor supports this action
by stating that the subcontractors in question are limited
by their expertise to only perform certain portions of the
particular subcontract. In reality the prime contractor is




2. 3 A Comparison of 5 State's Legislations
Presently only five states (Arkansas, California,
Delaware, New Mexico, and South Carolina) have bid listing
laws according to E. Colette Nelson, Vice President of the
American Subcontractors Association (ASA). As the
following comparisons show, each state's bid listing
legislature is unique.
2.3. 1 Arkansas
Arkansas law [ARK. STATS. 14-613] requires that all
contractors submitting bids on public construction
contracts with an estimated value of $20,000 or more must
list their subcontractors. Subcontractors to be listed
must be licensed and qualified as either mechanical,
electrical, roofing, and/or sheet metal contractors. The
prime contractor must submit the subcontractors names and
quotes in both his bid and in a separate sealed envelope
(3il6).
In the event that a listed subcontractor refuses to
enter into a contract, the prime contractor is allowed to
substitute with another subcontractor provided that the
replacement sub is approved by the architect, owner, and
the State Building Services. A particularly harsh
requirement is that the replacement subcontractor cost no
more than the original quote. If the replacement sub's
quote is less than the original bid the difference must be




California bid listing laws are cited in Gov. Code,
Title 1, Div. 5. Chap. 2, entitled "Subletting and
Subcontracting Fair Practices Act". California's bid
listing laws are the most detailed of the five states.
The California law requires that the priae contractor
list all subcontractors whose work is in excess of one half
of one percent (0.5%) of the total contract aiount on all
state construction jobs. Construction, repair, and
improvements on traffic signals, streets, highways, and
bridges are excluded fro* this law (3s 18).
All subcontractors aust be licensed with the state and
only one subcontractor can be listed for each portion of
work. The law also provides a list of penalties that can
be assessed against the priae contractor who has been
awarded the contract and failed to list one or aore
subcontractors. These penalties include cancelling of the
contract or a 10 percent fine of the subcontract involved
(3.21).
The law also discusses the effects of bid shopping and
bid peddling. Included in the law are penalties to be
assessed against the priae contractor if he is caught
circuaventing the bid listing requirements (3:18).
The procedure for substituting a listed subcontractor
after award is discussed in great detail. It is no doubt
the intent of the law to scrutinize such substitutions to




Delaware's bid listing laws are under statute 29,
para. 6911, entitled "Contracts for Public Buildings:
Listing of Subcontractors: Bidder as Subcontractor;
Substitution of Subcontractor: Penalties" (3i22).
Delaware law requires that subcontractors iust be
listed on all public works contracts (except projects
involving roads, streets or highways) that are in excess of
$10,000. Prise contractors listing themselves as
subcontractors iust be so licensed by the state to perform
that type of work and must normally engage in that type of
work. The agency administering the contract has the final
say in allowing the prime to perform specialty work (3i22).
Substitution of any subcontractor after the prime has
been awarded the contract will only be allowed if the
subcontractor is proven to be incapable of performing the
work, fails to execute a contract with the prime, has
defaulted on the project, or is no longer in business.
Again, approval is subject to agency review (3:23). The
law also gives the awarding agency the power to assign
penalties against the prime contractor if he does not use
all of the subcontractors listed. The amount of the fine
is up to agency discretion (3i23).
The Delaware state government states that the primary
purpose of the bid listing law is to protect the public
from the wasting of money. A secondary intent of the law




The state of New Mexico has incorporated bid listing
law into their "Subcontractors Fair Practices Act"
.
The
Act opens with the following statement:
LEGISLATIVE FINDINGS . --The legislature finds that
the practices of bid shopping and bid peddling in
connection with the construction, alteration and
repair of public works projects often result in poor
quality of material and workmanship to the detriment
of the public, deprive the public of the full benefits
of fair competition among contractors and sub-
contractors and lead to insolvencies and loss of wages
to employees (3i24).
As in previously discussed state's legislation the bid
listing law pertains to all public works construction
projects with the exception of street lighting, traffic
signals, and repairs or construction of roads, streets, and
highways (3i26).
The law dictates a bid listing threshold of $5000 or
one half of one percent (0.5%). Any portion of the job
that is not listed by the prime contractor implies that the
prime contractor is doing that portion of the work himself
(3i25).
New Mexico's bid listing law provides gives the
greatest leeway in allowing the substitution of a listed
subcontractor. These substitutions includes
(1) The listed subcontractor fails to execute the
contract.
(2) The subcontractor goes bankrupt.
(3) The subcontractor fails to perform his work.
22

(4) The prime contractor can prove that the
subcontractor was listed as a result of a clerical
error.
(5) When a bid alternate accepted by the using agency
causes the original low subcontractor's bid not to
be low.
(6) When the prime contractor can prove that the
listed subcontractor's bid is incomplete.
(7) When the listed subcontractor fails or refuses to
meet the bond requirements of the contractor.
The using agency has the right to approve any
subcontractor substitution (3«27).
As in the California bid listing laws, a prime
contractor will be penalized if he uses a subcontractor
that was not listed and who is performing work over the
amounts stipulated in the threshold. This penalty will
either be cancellation of the contract or a ten percent
(10%) fine based on the amount of work to be performed by
the non listed subcontractor (3i31).
It is interesting to note the strong parallels between
the California law and the New Mexico law. It is quite
clear that New Mexico modeled their legislation after
California's bid listing law.
2.3.5 South Carolina
Of the states discussed. South Carolina has the
briefest bid listing law. The law is located in the "South
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Carolina Consolidated Procurement Code" . Subarticle 3;
Section 11-35-3020(2 ) (b) . The law is shown in it's
entirety as follows:
(b) Bid Acceptance, In lieu of Section 11-35-
1520(7), the following provision shall apply. Bids
shall be accepted unconditionally without alteration
or correction, except as otherwise authorized in this
code. The using agency's invitation for bids shall
set forth all requirements of the bid including but
not limited to the following!
(i) Any bidder or offeror in response to an
invitation for bids shall set forth in his bid or
offer the naie and the location of the place of
business of each subcontractor who will perform work
or render service to the prime contractor to or about
the construction or who will specially fabricate and
install [a] portion of the work in an amount not to
exceed the following percentages
t
Prime contractor's total bid up to
three million dollars 2 1/2 %
Prime contractor's total bid is three
million to five million 2%
Prime contractor's total bid is over
five million dollars 11/2%
(ii) Failure to list subcontractors in
accordance with this section and any regulation which
may be promulgated by the board shall render the prime
contractor's unresponsive.
(iii) No prime contractor whose bid is
accepted shall substitute any person as subcontractor
in place of the subcontractor listed in the original
bid, except with the consent of the awarding
authority, for good cause shown.
(iv) The using agency shall send all
responsive bidders a copy of the bid tabulation within
ten working days following the bid opening (3t33).
The intent of this law is clear. Though it does not
mention bid shopping, the legislation is so written to
decrease the chances that it will occur. By far the
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briefest and most general of all state bid listing laws,
the question comes to mind as to how It fairs In the
courts. There was no Information found to indicate that it
has not been successfully defended in the courts.
2.4 Current State Status
The 1980 's were relatively active on the state bid
listing front. In 1983 the state of Arkansas adopted their
current bid listing law while the Governor of Wisconsin
vetoed a proposed bid listing bill for public construction
(13il). In 1988 Mew Mexico signed into law subcontractor
bid listing on public projects.
Today, two states (Mississippi and Missouri), are
entertaining the idea of adopting subcontractor bid listing
rules (2s 27). Opponents of bid listing laws in Mississippi
successfully shelved the bill in a committee for fiscal
year 1992. Backers of the bill intend to reintroduce it
during the 1993 session (14tll). A copy of Mississippi's
proposed law is contained in Appendix A of this report.
For comparison purposes, a sample bill proposed by the
American Subcontractors Association (ASA) is contained in
Appendix B. It is interesting to note the striking
similarity between the two documents. The ASA appears to




2. 5 The Legalities of Bid Listing
The variety of bid listing laws used throughout public
construction agencies has created soie legal issues. Those
states having highly detailed bid listing laws appear to
have the best chance of not losing their case in court.
The first issue usually challenged is the validity to
list subcontractors in the first place. At least one 1983
case in Minnesota found in favor of a prime contractor who
did not use a listed subcontractor. The court's opinion
was that since bid listing was not a state statute (only
the agency required bid listing) that the priae could not
be held to it (Holman Erection Co. vs. Orville E. Madsen &
Sons. Inc., 330 N.W. 2d 693) (8i 5. 4 (CR. 2 ) )
.
During the twenty years the U.S. General Service
Administration required bid listing, its validity was
upheld by the Comptroller General on numerous cases
(15t59). This is a contradiction to the Minnesota ruling
since subcontractor bid listing never became federal law
(lt59).
Other issues include when a prime contractor does not
list one or more subcontractors either intentionally or by
error. The question becomes is the bid responsive or not?
Another grey area is on what grounds does the agency allow
for substitution of a listed subcontractor. While many
state statutes provide some instances where a sub can be
replaced, all situations can not be covered (8i3.9-6). On
one federal government contract, the courts found in favor
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of the prime contractor who was not allowed to substitute a
subcontractor. The courts felt that the prise contractor
had just cause in desiring to replace the subcontractor and
awarded him $154,000 (11:58).
In the final analysis, the comprehensiveness of the
agencies bid listing laws and legal precedence will






3. 1 How Bid Depositories Work
The use of bid depositories has been on the decline
over the last ten years for reasons that will be discussed
later. Originally established to curtail subcontractor bid
shopping, bid depositories see only Halted use today.
Bid depositories were established by the construction
industry, specifically construction trade subcontractors
who are engaged in submitting sub-bids to general
contractors on large construction projects (Hi 57).
The general procedure is to use a "lock box" which is
aintained by the bid depository organization.
Subcontractors desiring to bid on a construction project
submit their sealed bids to the depository addressed to the
general contractors to whoa they desire to work with. A
second sealed bid is also prepared and addressed to the
depository for their records. A cut-off tiae of four hours
before the prime bid opening tiae is usually established.
No sub-bids will be accepted by the depository after the
cut-off tiae. At the depository closing tiae the lock box
is opened and the sub-bids are distributed to the general
contractors to whoa addressed. The general contractor then
completes his bidding documents using the subcontractor
quotes that he has received (Hi 57).
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The bid depository has as its option to publish all
the sub-bids, just the lowest sub-bid, or none at all.
Either way, the depository knows which bids were low and
will monitor which subcontractors are chosen by the priae
contractor who receives the award (4s 730).
The use of a depository is normally open to all
subcontractors of that particular trade, although
membership is usually required if a subcontractor is to use
the services of the bid depository. A priae contractor
using the bid depository is only required to adhere to the
rules of the depository (4s 730). A typical bid depository
rules are as followst
(1) Subcontractors belonging to the bid depository
aust use it exclusively.
(2) Priae contractors using the bid depository aust
accept only those bids that are held by the
depository.
(3) If a priae contractor uses the depository he aust
accept the lowest bid.
(4) The priae contractor is not allowed to split
subcontractor bids in an atteapt to coabine them
into a lower bid.
(5) If either a priae contractor or a subcontractor
violate the depository rules they can lose their
filing fee and/or be fined (4s 730).
Reading between the lines of these rules reveals that
a bid depository is ripe for bid collusion which of course
is illegal. Unfortunately, many depositories have resorted
to such tactics which is the subject of the next section.
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3. 2 The Legalities of Bid Depositories
Bid depositories have run afoul of federal and state
anti-trust laws more than any other bid shopping
curtailment method. Bid depositories by their very nature
are just one step away from the illegal restraint of free
trade.
Members of bid depositories expose themselves to
several types of legal proceedings. These include
civil/criminal action by the Federal Trade Commission
and/or the Anti-trust division of the Department of
Justice, similar legal proceedings by state anti-trust
agencies, and damage suits by competitors who have been
harmed by actions of the depository (1:55).
In the period 1943 to 1968 the Federal Trade
Commission initiated twenty-nine suits against bid
depositories (Ii55). As recently as 1986, a bid depository
operated for over twenty years in Memphis, Tennessee was
declared illegal by a federal administrative law judge
(2i28).
Typical activities by bid depositories that have been
found illegal include:
(1) Intentionally fixing price quotes of
subcontractors either by agreeing to specific
prices or using formulas to establish uniform
prices.
(2) Members of a depository agreeing among themselves
who will be the lowest bidder.
(3) Eliminating the lowest bids.
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(4) Subcontractors belonging to a depository using a
common estimator for their bids.
(5) Subcontractors comparing prices prior to award.
(6) Bid depositories boycotting prime contractors and
subcontractors who did not buy into their
service (1:55).
The leading legal case concerning the effect of anti-
trust laws on "legal" bid depositories is Christiansen vs.
Mechanical Contractors Bid Depository. 230 F.Supp. 186
(D.C. Utah, 1964) (lt57). The bid depository was formed by
most of the mechanical contractors in the state of Utah and
the depository received most of the state work. A member
of the depository (Christiansen) became disenchanted with
the depository and canceled his membership. Soon
thereafter, Christiansen lost the award of a subcontract to
a member of the depository who had a higher bid.
Christiansen filed suit against the depository under the
Sherman Anti Trust Act for damages due to lost profits in
the amount of $20,000.00 (It 56)
The court in their review recognized that the bid
depository was "... created to cope with the evils of bid
shopping and bid peddling". The court also noted that the
avowed purpose of the depository was "to promote the
principles of competitive free enterprise and to eliminate
as far as possible unfair bidding practices" (It 56).
The court though attacked several of the depositories
rules. The rule stating that prime contractors using the
bid depository could only use sub-bids from the depository
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was a major issue for the court. Other rules including not
allowing the prime and the subs to negotiate prior to
award, no splitting of subcontractor bids, and not allowing
subcontractors to submit any further bids on a project
after award if they did not bid on it in the first place
were all at issue with the court (It 56).
Even though the rules and actions of this bid
depository were consistent with standard operating rules
the court however found for the plaintiff and awarded him
damages in the amount of $60,000.00, three times what he
had asked for. This decision was upheld by the 10th
Circuit Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court declined to
review (It 56).
What actions can a bid depository take to protect
itself against legal proceedings? Commentators on bid
depositories have developed the following suggestions!
(1) Bid depositories should be administered by a
third party.
(2) The use of a bid depository should be open to all
contractors, i.e. no exclusive membership.
(3) No requirement for users of the depository to
deal only with the depository.
(4) No penalties for rule violations.





4. 1 How Separate Contracts Work
Separate contracts is the opposite of the ever popular
single contract method that uses a prime contractor who
directly contracts with subcontractors. The separate
contract method uses multiple prime contractors by trade
and generally no subcontractors. This process can generate
upwards of forty separate contracts for the agency to deal
with. Two approaches can be used to coordinate the
contractors. One method is to designate one contractor as
the general and use him to coordinate the other
contractors. The other method is for the owner to use the
services of a construction manager (CM) to coordinate the
contracts (I61II6).
Separate contracts are normally reserved for large and
complex projects. Examples include high-rise buildings,
nuclear power plants, oil refineries, convention centers,
and hospitals (10s 532).
Numerous reasons have contributed to the use of
separate contracts. On large projects, it is felt by some
that a single contract was to inflexible to deliver timely
and efficient construction services (10»532). Separate
contracts were also developed to put more of the
contracting process out in the open and to avoid corrupt
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bidding practices such as bid shopping (17:3). Ideally it
is hoped that separate contracts will bring about increased
competition with its corresponding reduction in
construction costs.
The key parts of a separate contract process include
t
(1) Developing distinct divisions of work.
(2) Properly prepared front end documents.
(3) Work descriptions spelled out in the contract.
(4) Establishing a list of qualified potential
bidders.
(5) The soliciting of bidders.
(6) Pre-bid meetings with prospective bidders.
(7) Bid opening.
(8) Award of contracts (16tll6).
4. 2 The Pros and Cons of Separate Contracts
The year 1875 marks the first major public sanctioning
of separate contracts. That year the state of Ohio
established the mandatory use of separate contracts for
most state and local construction. In 1912 New York
adopted a similar rule known as the "Wicks Law". The
Wicks Law requires separate contracts for major specialty
contractors including electrical, HVAC, plumbing, and a
general contractor (17i3). Since then, only two other
states (Illinois and Pennsylvania) have developed mandatory
separate contracts for public construction (17:17).
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Of these four states, the debates for and against the
New York law have been highly publicized and serve as the
basis for this report.
In the eighty years following the establishing of the
Wicks Law, it has been the source of constant debates and
attempts to have it repealed. Those desiring the law to
reaain in effect are naturally the specialty contractors
and their related craft unions. Opponents of the law
include general contractors, state and local construction
authorities, local school districts, and unions not
associated with specialty contractors (17t3).
In a nutshell, the opponents of the Wicks Law say that
repealing it would save the state $30 Billion a year in
construction costs, put coordination probleas on the
shoulders of the priae contractor, and aitigate the cities
liability for cost overruns. The proponents argue that
repealing the law would actually increase construction
costs, decrease competition, and result in poorer quality
(18il). Two separate studies of the Wicks law were
concluded in 1992. One study was conducted by the New York
City School Construction Authority (NYCSCA) and the other
study was coaaissioned by the Electrical Contracting
Foundation (ECF). The results of these studies are
suaaarized in the following sections.
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4.2.1 The New York Citv School Construction Authority
Study
The NYCSCA study was contracted out to the consulting
firm of Ashenfelter & Ashaore. According to the
consultants, all variables were carefully isolated and
studied. The study reviewed 160 public works projects
performed by New York City in the 1980s (19*27).
The results of the study are rather startling.
Comparing projects performed under the Wicks Law with those
projects exempt from the statute found that projects
performed under the law cost 13% more and took 60% longer
to complete (19t27). In real numbers this translates to
projects performed under the law took 15.6 months longer to
complete and cost $14 per square foot more for projects of
the same size, scope* complexity, and time period (19t28).
The consultants found the largest single square foot cost
increase to be the cost of government management of
separate bid contracts. The cost increase equated to $7
per square foot over management costs associated with
single bid contracts (19.28).
There is no doubt that this report will be heavily
quoted by Wicks Law opponents during the next legislative
battle to repeal the Wicks Law.
4.2.2 The Electrical Contracting Foundation Study
The Electrical Contracting Foundation study entitled
Single vs. Separate Bidding is much broader in scope than
the previously discussed study. The study, performed by
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Professor Brian Becker, School of Management, State
University of New York at Buffalo, is the first installment
of a report that will eventually cover every state that
administers mandatory or optional separate contracting
methods. The present study provides heavy coverage to the
Wicks Law in New York and reviews twelve other state's
contracting methods. The purpose of the report is to
present both sides of the argument for and against
separate contracts and then to present facts backing up
either position. The report also discusses separate
contracts in the private sector.
The study reviewed construction projects in three New
York state agencies from 1980 to 1992. Using statistical
analysis, the bid and actual direct costs were compared.
The results show that separate contracts have a 2.9% lower
cost than do single bid contracts, with 90% of that cost
reduction being in the lower bid amounts of the separate-
prime contractors. The author makes if clear that the cost
of administering the contract was not included in his
study. In the previous study, administrative costs made up
half of the price increase of separate contracts over
single bid contracts.
4.2.3 Comparing the Studies
The two studies results clearly contradict each other.
While the NYCSCA study showed a cost increase of 13% on
Wicks Law projects over non Wicks Law projects, the ECF
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study determined that Wicks Law jobs actually were 2.9%
lower in direct construction costs over non Wicks Law
projects.
The NYCSCA study also determined that half of the
price increase (6.5%) was due to the extra cost of managing
a separate contract project over that of a single bid. The
ECF acknowleges that they were unable to provide data for
the public management of separate contracts simply because
the agencies were unable to provide such data when asked.
If the 6.5% administrative cost increase is added to
the 2.9% construction cost decrease quoted by the ECF
study, then Wicks Law projects would reflect an overall
cost increase of 3.6%. Still, a long way off from the
13% quoted by the NYCSCA study.
Both studies concur that administration costs of a the
separate contract method are much higher over that of a
single bid, prime contractor managed project. In the eyes
of public officials, this is possibly the largest negative
factor of separate contracts. To make matters worse. New
York has a unique way of handling project management.
Public administration officials are not allowed to contract
out for construction management services. This puts
construction management of separate contracts squarely on
the shoulders of city officials (17s 18).
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4. 3 The Legalities of Separate Contracts
By their very nature, separate contracts require a
high level of coordination. This level of coordination
takes experience, skill, and technical/administrative
expertise. A failure to properly coordinate the
contractors can lead to disastrous delay claims (10:532).
When delays on the job happen and additional costs are
incurred by the separate contractors it is reasonable to
assume claims will follow shortly. The owner will, no
doubt, be the subject of some of these claims (10:534).
There are three possible outcomes when either the
owner, (through a contractor, construction manager, or
architect), coordinates a project and delays occur:
(1) The owner is held blameless.
(2) The owner is liable for the contractor's failure
to coordinate if he did not take reasonable steps
to coordinate the issue.
(3) The owner is strictly liable if the coordination
was not properly accomplished (10:534).
Many owners feeling the pinch of a additional
liabilities have sought relief through the contract
wording. As one writer states:
Because each contractor is solely in privity with
the owner, there is an expectation to look to the
owner for damages when a site coordination breakdown
occurs. In the face of this exposure, some owners
have sought to transfer this risk back on to the
contractors performing the work. Representative
contract clauses to effect this transfer are:
The Contractor agrees that he will be responsible
to any other contractor performing work related to the
Project for any loss, injury, damage or delay caused
by the Contractor. The Contractor and his Performance
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Bond Surety shall Indemnify and hold harmless the
COMMISSION, the Construction Manager and the Engineer
from and against any claim brought against any of thei
by another contractor as a result of the Contractor's




BID SHOPPING AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
5. 1 General Services Administration
In a time where numerous states not only recognize the
detrimental effects of bid shopping but have some form of
legislation to inhibit it, the Federal Government has no
such policy. Even more interesting, as section 5.2 will
reveal, one branch of the Federal Government actually
endorses bid shopping.
According to Colette Nelson, Vice President of the
ASA, the last federal agency utilizing any sort of anti-bid
shopping regulation was the General Services Administration
(GSA). From approximately 1963 through 1983, the GSA had
a strong bid listing law that prevailed in many court cases
(li61) .
In a case that challenged GSA's bid listing law
shortly after it is was enacted, the Comptroller General
wrote
i
"The . . . provision for listing subcontractors was
aimed primarily at the practice of 'bid shopping,'
which is reported to have been a matter of growing
concern to the General Services Administration (GSA)
and to the construction industry over a period of
years." 43 Coup. Gen. 206,207 (1:61).
The Comptroller General further wrote
i
"
. . .to end such bid shopping would create a true
competitive market with resultant savings to the
Government." 43 Comp. Gen. 207 (1:61).
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GSA's bid listing laws were contained in part 41 of
the Combined Federal Regulations. The law called for
listing of all plumbing, heating, air conditioning,
ventilation, electrical, and elevator subcontractors.
Additionally, any individual category of work that exceeded
3.5% of the total contract amount must also be listed. The
bid listing laws were required on all new construction
projects over $150,000 and on all alteration projects over
$500,000. The regulation also stated that a prime
contractor's bid would be held non responsive if he failed
to list a subcontractor that he was required to (1:60).
In late 1983, GSA announced that it was considering
elimination of their bid listing regulation. Strong
opposition was fielded by the ASA but on January 03, 1984,
GSA formally dropped their bid listing requirement (20:1).
My research failed to locate any reason for this
action by GSA. Telephone calls to GSA requesting
information on this decision were met with ignorance. The
following statement found in a trade journal provides one
possible reasons
"Initial contacts with GSA seem to indicate that
the agency is not prepared to consider the impact of
its proposal on small businesses." (20il).
From a political standpoint, the law was enacted in
1963 during the term of a very strong Democratic President,
whose administration was no doubt pro small business. The
law was repealed during the term of an equally strong
Republican President whose alliances were tied to big
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business. Being an educated guess, politics Bight not have
had a part in GSA's decision. On the other hand, an agency
as big as GSA must bend with the political winds.
5. 2 The Federal Trade Coaaission
The Federal Trade Coaaission (FTC) aaong other duties
are the watchdogs enforcing the Sheraan Anti-Trust Law.
The FTC has been active for years investigating the various
aethods that have been and are used to prohibit bid
shopping. As recently as late 1990, investigators and
lawyers of the FTC conducted a sweeping investigation of
the ASA, AGC, and the ASPE in search of evidence of bid
collusion (2s28).
Mr. Michael McNeeley, assistant director of the FTC's
Bureau of Competition states:
"Federal anti-trust law prohibits concerted or
coerced pricing action, and trade groups that try to
prohibit their aeabers froa bid-shopping run the risk
of engaging in an illegal restraint of trade." (2:28).
Anti-trust lawyers working for the FTC go one step
further and state that they view bid shopping as a fora of
auction and that there is nothing wrong with it (2:28).
The law that McNeely refers to is located in 48 CFR
Ch.l, subpart 3.3 - Reports of Suspected Antitrust
Violations. The following two paragraphs applyt
3.301 (a) Practices that eliainate competition
or restrain trade usually lead to excessive prices and
aay warrant criminal, civil, or adainistrative action
against the participants. Examples of anticompetitive
practices are collusive bidding, follow-the-leader
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pricing, rotated low bids, collusive price estimating
systems, and sharing of the business.
3.303 (b) The antitrust laws are intended to
ensure that markets operate competitively. Any
agreement or mutual understanding among competing
firms that restrains the natural operation of market
forces is suspect (21:42).
Reading between the lines of the FAR regulations would
indicate, at a minimum, a passive acceptance of bid
shopping. Any agency attempting to limit bid shopping
could be intimidated by the FAR's wording.
The FTC in its statements virtually endorse bid
shopping in the name of free and open competition. The
contradiction in beliefs between the federal and state






6. 1 Minnesota Bidding History
The state of Minnesota has developed a unique approach
in their public construction bidding practices. Because of
its uniqueness and success, the Minnesota plan warrants its
own chapter in this report.
Prior to the late 1980 's, Minnesota did not have a
legally mandated bidding method. State construction
agencies used a mix of both separate contracts and single
prime contracts (17il8).
Minnesota experienced the worst of both bidding
methods. The single prime contracts created problems of
bid shopping and bid pedalling while the separate contracts
method suffered coordination and litigation problems
(17.18).
State contracting officials, namely the Building
Construction Division (BCD) and the Materials Management
Division (MMD), witnessed the continued deterioration of
the bidding system and decided to fix it permanently
(17.19).
Instead of following the lead of other states by
legally mandating separate contracts or single prime
contracts the state officials decided to take a new
approach to the problem. Using what is popularly today
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called "partnering techniques", the BCD and MMD got
together with the Minnesota Associated General Contractors
and several specialty contractors including the Minnesota
Mechanical Contractors Association and the Minnesota
Electrical Association to hammer out a solution. After
nearly one year of discussions and negotiations, the
parties reached agreement on a new bidding and contract
plan (17,19).
6. 2 How the Minnesota Plan Works
The Minnesota plan is both simple yet effective. The
bidding portion of this plan includes the following seven
elementst
(1) The state will use only single prime contracts
for public construction.
(2) Mechanical and electrical contracts are bid
separately. These bids are due to the MMD two
(2) days prior to the prime bid opening date.
(3) General contractors desiring to submit a bid then
have the two days to review the scope of work
with those subcontractors submitting bids. The
general contractors can then choose which
subcontractors they intend to use.
(4) The bid amount as originally submitted by the
subcontractor can not be changed by either the
prime or the subcontractor.
(5) The subcontractor must submit a joint bid bond to
both the state and the prime contractor. Along
with the bid bond the contractor can also state
which general contractors he will not work for.
(6) The state agency will award the contract to the
prime with the lowest responsive bid.
(7) This bidding law applies to all contracts with an
estimated value exceeding $100,000 (17il9).
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6 . 3 The Pros and Cons of the Minnesota Plan
The Minnesota plan is the best bidding plan researched
for this report. The state agency is free from the
coordination and litigation problems they faced under their
previous policy. Additional competition benefits are
realized by the quasi separate bid aspect of this plan.
The issue of bid shopping and bid peddling are for all
practical purposes eliminated yet both prime and
subcontractors have the right to refuse to work with the
other (17il9).
Testimony from state officials indicates that prime
contractors are offering lower prices under this plan.
This is because primes have two days to review bids and
discuss work scope with the subcontractors instead of a few
hours or even minutes under the old policy (17i21).
All participants in this plan including prime and
subcontractors remain positive about this plan. In fact,
no negative aspects of this plan have been voiced by the
parties involved. This is due in part to meetings held
every six months between state officials and contractors to
further refine the policy. Also, with bid shopping and bid
peddling eradicated, a feeling of mutual trust now exists
between the general contractors and subcontractors (17:20).
The brilliance of this plan should not be overlooked






Bid shopping is an unethical practice that has been in
existence for over 100 years. The results of bid shopping
are poor relations between contractors, shoddy work, and an
increase in costs.
Bid shopping's tenacity is due to the fact that
providing a law making bid shopping illegal would be
ineffective. There would be no way to enforce such a law.
This has left public agencies with the task of developing
their own Methods in dealing with the problem. As the
chart on Appendix C illustrates, no one method is used by
the majority of the states. The methods use by the states
to minimize bid shopping, i.e. bid listing, bid filing,
and separate contracts are all "band-aid" efforts. Each
method attempts to stop bid shopping through some procedure
that makes bid shopping more difficult to accomplish. But
these methods have loop holes that an unscrupulous
contractor will take advantage of.
Bid shopping proponents have a strong ally in the
federal government. When the largest public building owner
in the country accepts bid shopping as a normal feature of
doing business, it is not something to take lightly.
Until recently, there was no hope of developing a
system that would end bid shopping for good and be agreed
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to by all parties. Then along case the "Minnesota Plan".
The Minnesota plan works and works well, period. One of
the successes of this Initiative Is that It gets to the
heart of the matter of bid shopping. The plan was
developed by owners, contractors, and subcontractors In an
ataosphere of mutual trust. The Minnesota plan Is just
another example of people getting tired of the fighting and
litigation problems effecting the construction Industry.
Like partnering, the Minnesota plan puts the handshake back




MISSISSIPPI SENATE BILL NO. 2975
AN ACT TO REQUIRE THAT BIDS FOR THE CONSTRUCTION
ALTERATION OR REPAIR OF ANY PUBLIC BUILDING OR PUBLIC WORK
WHICH IS EXPECTED TO COST IN EXCESS OF $100,000.00 SHALL
INCLUDE THE NAMES OF CERTAIN SUBCONTRACTORS WITH WHOM THE
BIDDER WILL CONTRACT IF AWARDED THE CONTRACT; TO REQUIRE
THE CONTRACTOR WHO IS AWARDED THE CONTRACT TO USE THE
SUBCONTRACTORS LISTED IN THE BID; TO PROHIBIT A BIDDER FOR
A CONTRACT TO LIST HIMSELF AS A SUBCONTRACTOR AND TO
PROVIDE CERTAIN EXCEPTIONS TO THIS REQUIREMENT; TO PROVIDE
THAT THE FAILURE TO SUBMIT THE REQUIRED LIST OF
SUBCONTRACTORS WITH BID SHALL RESULT IN REJECTION OF THE
BID; TO ALLOW SUBSTITUTIONS OF SUBCONTRACTORS UNDER CERTAIN
CIRCUMSTANCES; TO PROVIDE THE CATEGORIES OF WORK FOR WHICH
SUBCONTRACTORS MUST BE NAMED; TO PROVIDE PENALTIES FOR
VIOLATIONS OF THIS ACT; AND FOR RELATED PURPOSES.
BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF
MISSISSIPPI!
SECTION 1. (1) In addition to all other requirements
imposed by law, every invitation to bid on a contract for
the construction, alteration or repair of any public
building or public work of the state or any political
subdivision thereof, which is expected to cost in excess of
One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00) shall require
each bidder to submit as part of his bid the names of the
subcontractors for the categories of work for which
subcontractors are required to be listed pursuant to
subsection (7) of this section, with whom the bidder, if
awarded the contract, will subcontract for performance of
the categories of work designated on the list to be
submitted with the bid or to indicated by naming himself
that a category of work on the list shall not be
subcontracted.
(2) The invitation shall further require each bidder
to agree, if awarded the contract, not to have any of the
designated categories of work performed by an individual or
firm other than those named in the bid.
(3) No bidder for such a contract shall list himself
as the subcontractor of any part of the public building or
public work unless the bidder, in addition to holding a
valid certificate of responsibility issued by the State
Board of Contractors, shall also be recognized in the
industry not only as a prime contractor but also as a
subcontractor or contractor in and for any such part or
parts of such work so listed. Neither the state, nor any
political subdivision thereof, shall accept any bid for





as the prime contractor, if the bidder has listed himself
as the subcontractor for any subcontractor category unless
it has been established to the satisfaction of the awarding
agency that the bidder has customarily performed the
specialty work of such subcontractor category by artisans
regularly employed by the bidder in his organization, and
that the bidder is recognized in the industry as a bona
fide subcontractor or contractor in such specialty work and
subcontractor category. Typical subcontractor categories
involving their own respective types of specialty work
shall include but not be limited to plumbing, electrical
wiring, heating, roofing, insulation, weather stripping,
masonry, bricklaying and plastering. The decision of the
awarding agency as to whether a bidder who lists himself as
the subcontractor for a subcontractor category shall be
final and binding upon all bidders, and no action of any
nature shall lie against any awarding agency because of its
decision in this regard.
(4) A bidder's failure to submit as part of his bid
the names of the subcontractors with whom the bidder, if
awarded the contract, will subcontract performance of the
work shall result in rejection of the bidder's bid as
nonresponsive.
(5) Substitutions for the subcontractors named in the
bid, including substitution for the bidder when the bidder
has listed himself as a subcontractor, may be authorized by
the contracting officer only in compelling circumstances,
including, but not limited to, a named subcontractor death
or physical disability, dissolution of the subcontractor's
corporation or partnership, bankruptcy, inability to obtain
or the loss of a license necessary for the performance of
the category of the work for which named, failure or
inability to comply with a requirement of law applicable to
contractors, subcontractors, or construction, or failure to
meet qualifications specified in the invitation to bid and
the resulting contract. The bidder or the contractor shall
submit to the contracting officer such supporting evidence
as the contracting officer may deem relevant and necessary
for consideration of the request, substitution for a
subcontractor shall be allowed only upon receipt of the
contracting officer's written approval.
(6) The term "subcontractor" for purposes of this
section means the individual or firm with whom the bidder
proposes to enter into a subcontract for manufacturing,
fabricating, installing or otherwise performing work in
accordance with the specifications applicable to any




performed by the subcontractor at the construction site or
away from the site.
(7) The contracting officer for each project to which
this section is applicable shall determine the categories
of work for which subcontractors to be included in each
such invitation shall include all categories of work
expected to cost more than Fifty Thousand Dollars
($50,000.00). Other categories may be included on the list
when, in the judgment of the contracting officer, the
inclusion is necessary to effectuate the purpose of this
section.
(8) Any subcontractor agreement actually executed by
the contractor and each subcontractor shall not impose upon
the subcontractor terms and conditions more onerous to the
subcontractor than those contained in the agreement between
the owner and contractor.
(9) (a) A contractor who violates the provisions of
this act violates his own contract and the contracting
officer shalli
(i) Cancel the contract; or
(ii) Assess the contractor a penalty in an
amount of not more than ten percent (10%) of the amount bid
by the listed subcontractor, but in no case less than the
difference of the amount between the listed subcontractor
and the subcontractor used. Such penalty shall be
deposited into the fund out of which the contract is
awarded. In any proceeding under this section, the
contractor shall be entitled to a hearing after notice.
(b) A violation of the provisions of this act
constitutes grounds to revoke a certificate of
responsibility issued by the State Board of Contractors.
(c) Any listed subcontractor removed in violation
of this act may bring an action in the circuit court for




Model Bill - Bid Listing on State Construction
(American Subcontractors Association)
1. Every invitation to bid on a contract for the
construction, alteration, or repair of any public
building or public work of the state (or commonwealth)
which is expected to cost in excess of $100,000 shall
require each bidder to submit as part of its bid the
names of the subcontractors with which the bidder, if
awarded the contract, will subcontract for performance
of work in excess of . 5 percent of the total price of
its bid, the categories of work designated on the list
to be submitted with the bid, or to indicate by naming
itself that a category of work on the list shall not be
subcontracted.
2. The invitation shall further require each bidder to
agree, if awarded the contract, not to have any of the
designated categories of work performed by an
individual or firm other than those named in the bid.
3. Substitutions for the subcontractors named in the bid
may be authorized by the contracting officer only in
compelling circumstances (including, but not limited
to, a named subcontractor's death or physical
disability (if an individual); dissolution (if a
corporation or partnership); bankruptcy; failure to
provide acceptable performance and payment bonds if
specified in the invitation to bid; inability to
comply with a requirement of law applicable to
contractors, subcontractors, or construction; failure
to meet qualifications specified in the invitation to
bid and the resulting contract), but only upon
submission by the bidder or the contractor, as the case
may be, to the contracting officer of justification,
such supporting evidence as the contracting officer may
deem relevant and necessary for consideration of the
request, and receipt of the contracting officer's
written approval.
4. The term "subcontractor" for purposes of this Act shall
be deemed to mean the individual or firm with whom the
bidder proposes to enter into a subcontract for
manufacturing, fabricating, installing, or otherwise
performing work in accordance with the specifications
applicable to any category included on the list,
whether the work is to be performed by the
subcontractor at the construction site or away from the
site.
5. The contracting officer for each project to which this
Act is applicable shall determine the categories of




bidders. The listing of subcontractors to be included
in each such invitation shall include all categories of
work comprising more than . 5 percent of the total
estimated cost of the contract. Other categories may
be included on the list when, in the judgment of the
contracting officer, the inclusion is necessary to
effectuate the purpose of this Act.
6. This Act shall be effective at the beginning of the
next fiscal year and shall apply to all invitations to
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